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23 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Harlow

Office of International Monetary Affairs

FROM:

Chief, East-West Regional Branch, East European

Division, Office of European Analysis

SUBJECT : East European Economic Outlook

1. Most of Eastern Europe has withstood the severe credit crunch that began in 1980 and peaked in early 1982. The regimes responded by imposing austerity, mostly in the form of cutting investment and imports. GNP growth for the region virtually stagnated in 1980-82, compared to annual growth in excess of 4 percent just a few years earlier. Domestic stabilization measures resulted in the intended improvements in the external accounts. The chronic hard currency current account deficits disappeared last year when the region ran a trade surplus of \$1.4 billion and a current account surplus of \$0.1 billion.

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2. The improvement in hard currency balances has continued in 1983. This year's trade surplus will rise to \$3.9 billion and the current account surplus to \$1.6 billion due mainly to reduced Yugoslav deficits. The countinuing pressures for adjustment contributed to a further slowdown in GNP growth for most countries. The small revival of economic growth for Eastern Europe as a whole results largely from the pickup for Poland.

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3. Eastern Europe's external adjustment is beginning to produce some improvement in bankers' attitudes. The banks have stopped reducing their exposure to most countries and are even extending a few new credits to the more creditworthy regimes. Slight easing of the financial constraint should permit some reduction in the region's trade surplus in 1984. Lenders, nonetheless, remain cautious about increasing their exposure significantly. There is little prospect for a resolution of Poland's financial crisis, Yugoslavia will require more debt relief in 1984, and some bankers fear that Romania, Hungary, or East Germany may require rescheduling. As a result, the region

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will note to continue running payments surpruses. The East	
Europeans should be able to keep their current accounts in the	
black and achieve small gains in needed imports provided economic	
recovery in the West translates into increased East European	
exports.	25X1
4. Weathering the worst of the financial crisis does little	
to improve Eastern Europe's economic outlook. Resources will	
— remain tight due to limited hard currency import capacity.	
possible further cuts in Soviet deliveries of energy and other	25X1
raw materials, and sluggish growth in the industrial labor	
formal Dadystick is during the three mustrial labor	
force. Productivity is dropping because of the loss of Western	
imports, investment cuts, falling living standards, and numerous	
systemic rigidities. GNP for the region is projected to grow at	
around 1 percent annually over the next several years.	25 X
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TALLE 1

EASTERN EUROPE: Real GNP Growth Rates, Actual 1981-1982 and Projected 1983-1984 (in percent)

	1981	1982	1983	1984
Eastern Europe	-0.6	-0.1	1.0	1.0
Bulgaria	3.0	2.8	1.5	2.0
Czechoslovakia	-1.1	0.5	1.0	1.0
East Germany	2.4	0.5	0.5	1.0
Hungary	0.4	1.7	0.5	0.5
Poland	-5.4	-4.0	1.5	1.5
Romania	0.6	2.7	1.0	1.0
Yugoslavia	1.5	0.3	-1.5	-1.5

NOTE: GNP estimates are based on Western concepts and procedures, with the exception of the data for Yugoslavia, which are Gross Social Product based on a material product concept of national income.

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<u>EASTERN EUROPE</u>: Hard Currency Current Account Balances (Billion US\$)

	<u>1981</u>	1982	1983 ^a	<u>1984 ^a</u>
Eastern Europe Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-5.5	0.1	1.6	2.2
	-3.6	1.4	3.9	3.3
	-1.9	-1.3	-2.3	-1.1
Bulgaria Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5
	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4
	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-0.1	0.2	0.6	0.6
	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.8
	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2
East Germany Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-0.5	1.2	1.2	1.1
	0.1	1.5	1.2	0.9
	-0.6	-0.3	0.0	0.2
Hungary Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-0.7	-0.1	0.3	0.4
	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.9
	-1.2	-0.9	-0.6	-0.5
Poland Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-2.2	-1.0	-1.7	-1.5
	-0.4	0.4	1.0	1.0
	-1.8	-1.4	-2.7	-2.5
Romania Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-0.8	0.7	0.9	0.8
	0.2	1.5	1.7	1.3
	-1.0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.5
Yugoslavia Current Account Trade Account Invisibles and Transfers	-1.8	-1.4	-0.3	0.3
	-4.9	-3.8	-2.2	-2.0
	3.1	2.4	1.9	2.3

a Projected